Joint Custody in Louisiana by Hawkins, Lois E.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 43 | Number 1
September 1982
Joint Custody in Louisiana
Lois E. Hawkins
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Lois E. Hawkins, Joint Custody in Louisiana, 43 La. L. Rev. (1982)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol43/iss1/9
COMMENTS
JOINT CUSTODY IN LOUISIANA
With the 1981 adoption of an act authorizing joint custody of
children after separation or divorce, the Louisiana legislature has
created myriad complex problems which will challenge Louisiana
lawyers and judges.' This comment will examine the historical develop-
ment of child custody in Louisiana and other states, discuss the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of joint custody, review the statutory and
jurisprudential enactment of joint custody in other states, analyze the
Louisiana statute, and suggest some possible applications for the Loui-
siana attorney whose client may be a candidate for a joint custody
arrangement.
Historical Development
The problem which has perplexed lawmakers and courts at least
since the reign of King Solomon' is how to settle a dispute between
two persons, both of whom seek custody of a child. More particularly,
the current issue is which of two parents is entitled to custody of
a child or children of the marriage when that marriage has terminated
by separation or divorce. Although the question has remained the
same, the answer has undergone several distinct evolutions, each of
which has reflected shifts in social and economic patterns.
The Roman patria potestas concept gave the father absolute domin-
ion over the persons and properties of his children English feudal
law incorporated much of this tradition, primarily to protect and en-
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1. 1981 La. Acts, No. 283. Its purpose is defined as:
To amend and reenact Article 146, Paragraph A of Article 157, and Article 250
of the Louisiana Civil Code and to amend and reenact Articles 4031 and 4262
of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, relative to custody and tutorship of
children pending litigation and after separation or divorce, to provide for joint
custody, to provide for natural co-tutorship, and otherwise to provide with respect
thereto.
2. 1 Kings 3:23-27 (Revised Standard Version).
3. "The ancient Roman laws gave the father a power of life and death over his
children . . . all (a son's) acquisitions belonged to the father . . . for his life." 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *451 (G. Shanswood ed. 1860). "The
oldest male ancestor not only has complete control over the persons of his descen-
dants, even to the extent of inflicting the death penalty on them in the exercise of
his domestic jurisdiction, but he alone has any rights in private law." H. JOLOWICZ,
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 118 (1932).
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sure the orderly passage of property from one generation to the next.'
Control over the children was incidental to the father's control over
property and to the merging of the legal identity of the wife into
the person of the husband.' By the early 19th century, the mother
had gained some visitation rights and the right to custody of young
children.' American courts initially adopted a similar paternal
preference but moved more rapidly than did British courts in develop-
ing the "tender years" doctrine, which presumes that very young
children require their mother's nurturing.7
In France, the Roman influence was also evident. The father was
4. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 451; Brosky & Alford, Sharpening Solomon's
Sword: Current Considerations in Child Custody Cases, 81 DICK. L. REV. 683, 684 (1977).
5. "[Tlhe very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the mar-
riage." W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 441. Examples of the rigidity of the "paternal
preference rule" include The King v. de Manneville, 5 East 331, 7 Rev. Rep. 693 (K.B.
1804), in which the alien French father was given custody of an 8 month old nursing
infant whom he had taken by force from its mother after his cruelty drove her from
his home, and Ex parte Skinner, 9 Moore 278, 27 Rev. Rep. 710 (K.B. 1824), in which
the custodial father was in jail and was visited there by his mistress and 6 year old
son daily. The Court of Common Pleas obviously sympathized with the mother who
sought a change in custody, but it had no authority to remove the child from the
father or his mistress on a writ of habeas corpus and recommended she apply to
Chancery for relief. In contrast, the mother of an illegitimate child was always entitl-
ed to possession of it, according to King v. Hopkins, 7 East 579, 8 Rev. Rep. 686 (K.B.
1806). See generally Note, Joint Custody Awards: Toward the Development of Judicial
Standards, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 105, 106 (1979).
6. British Infants Custody Act, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., ch. 54. This act contained the
first expression of the "tender years" policy; it allowed mothers to have custody of
the children until they reached the age of seven. This was extended in 1873 to allow
the mother to keep the child until it reached the age of sixteen. British Infants Custody
Act of 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., ch. 12. See text at note 23, infra.
7. See, e.g., Magee v. Holland, 27 N.J.L. 86 (1858) (This case is interesting because
it involves a "child-napping" by the mother and the return of the children to the father.);
Latham v. Latham, 71 Va. (30 Gratt) 307 (1878) (The father has the right to custody;
the mother has no right to visitation when her intransigence has caused the separa-
tion.); Carr v. Carr, 63 Va. (22 Gratt) 168, 174 (1872) (The paramount right of the father
is recognized once the "tender nursing period has passed by."). An often-quoted case
extolling the merits of the "maternal preference rule" is Helms v. Franciscus, 2 Bl.
Ch. 544 (Md. 1830), in which the judge rhapsodized as follows:
[Elven a court of common law will not go so far as to hold nature in contempt,
and snatch helpless, pulling infancy from the bosom of an affectionate mother
and place it in the coarse hands of the father. The mother is the softest and
safest nurse of infancy, and with her it will be left in opposition to this general
right of the father.
In all of these cases, the courts gave recognition to the "tender years" doctrine,
but declined to apply it to children beyond nursing age. It appears from the language
used in these cases that the judges hoped, by denying the mother's application for
custody, to force her back to the matrimonial domicile and thus encourage reconciliation.
[Vol. 43
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the primary holder of la puissance paternelle;' only if he could not
or would not exercise it did the mother have this right? The French
commentators report that by the end of the 19th century, the mother
was occasionally given preference when the custody dispute involved
very young children or girls.'0 However, the maternal preference was
not so pronounced in France, because the spouse who was not at fault
and obtained the divorce was always awarded custody unless unusual
circumstances existed."
Elements of both Anglo-American tradition and French tradition
were absorbed into Louisiana law. The Anglo-American influence is
evidenced by Louisiana's approach to provisional child custody pend-
ing the separation or divorce hearing; the progressive amendments
to Civil Code article 146, dealing with pendente lite custody, indicate
a gradual shift from the father to the mother. From 1800 to 1888 pro-
visional custody pending litigation was granted to the husband in all
cases12 unless it could be proved that there were "strong reasons to
deprive him of it.' 3 The 1888 amendment completely reversed this
by specifying provisional custody was to be given to the wife in all
cases.' In accord with French tradition, however, permanent custody
was theoretically unaffected by paternal or maternal preferences;"
Civil Code article 157, which controlled permanent custody, granted
custody to the spouse who had obtained the separation or divorce."
8. 1 M. PLANIOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL, n' 1250 & 1257 (12th ed. 1939).
9. M. PLANIOL, supra note 8, at n' 1637-42 & 1645-47.
10. 3 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, DES
PERSONNES, no 269-70 (2d ed. 1902).
11. "Les enfants seront confies a l'epoux qui a obtenu le divorce . NOUVEAU
CODE CIVIL art. 302 (Jurisprudence Generale de M.M. Dalloz Les Codes Annotes, Vol. 1)
(G. Griolet & C. Verge 1900).
12. "If there are children of the marriage whose provisional administration is claim-
ed by both husband and wife it shall be granted to the husband whether he be plain-
tiff or defendant." PROJET DU GOUVERNMENT, bk. I, tit. VI, art. 32 (1800); "whose provi-
sional keeping is claimed by both husband and wife, the suit being yet pending and
undecided, it shall be granted to the husband .... ." LA. Civ. CODE art. 146 (as it
appeared prior to 1888 La. Acts, No. 124). This language survived the 1825 and 1870
amendments. (For the above quotes, see LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 146, "History and Text
of Former Codes" (West 1952)).
13. LA. Cir. CODE art. 146 (as it appeared in 1870).
14. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146 (as amended by 1888 La. Acts, No. 124) ("[Ilt shall be
granted to the wife. ... ).
15. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 302 (H. Cachard trans., 1930).
16. J.F.C. v. M.E., 6 Rob. 135 (La. 1843). "In all cases of separation, the children
shall be placed under the care of the party who shall have obtained the separation.
* . ." LA. CIV. CODE art. 157 (as it appeared in 1888). This article retained basically the
same wording from 1808 to 1970. The effect of this was to award permanent custody
only to the marital partner who was not at fault in the dissolution of the marriage.
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Despite this specific statutory command, however, judicial decisions
granting permanent custody roughly paralleled the pattern established
in cases granting provisional custody. Over an extended period of time,
the father's rights gradually yielded to those of the mother.17 This
sometimes occurred upon the recommendation of a family meeting
called to decide which alternative would be most advantageous to the
children.18 Later decisions were based on the discretion given to the
judge in the 1921 amendment to article 157."9
The gradual shift away from the father's dominance in custody
of children can be partially explained by the move away from an
agrarian, feudal society in which a person's attachment to land was
the basis of societal and economic rights. With an increasingly in-
dustrialized society, land ownership and its orderly transmission
became less important; the father's dominance of persons and
patrimony decreased accordingly.' "As men began leaving their homes
in order to sustain them, women became - by default - progressively
more important within their confines . . . . [T]he supremacy of the
17. This is apparent in the decisions of the following cases: Gahn v. Darby, 36
La. Ann. 70 (1880) (wife's allegations of cruelty were insufficient justification for her
refusal to follow husband to new domicile; therefore father was entitled to judgment
and custody of the child); Bursha v. Lane, 105 La. 112, 29 So. 712 (1901) (though father
obtained separation, wife was awarded custody of child because it was only 5 years
old; right of father to seek modification when child got older was expressly reserved);
Copping v. Termini, 135 La. 224, 65 So. 132 (1914) (wife's poor health required her
to live with her mother, so no separation was granted to husband, and custody of
child remained with mother); Laplace v. Briere, 152 La. 235, 92 So. 881 (1922) (father
had been given temporary custody, but permanent custody after divorce was granted
to mother who had obtained the divorce and was not shown to be unfit, nor were
there greater advantages to child in entrusting it to the father).
18. Crochet v. Dugas, 126 La. 285, 52 So. 495 (1910); Bursha v. Lane, 105 La. 112,
29 So. 712 (1901). The Louisiana Civil Code used to require a family meeting to give
the judge advice and counsel in many situations involving the rights of minors. This
requirement was gradually dropped as the appropriate Code articles were amended.
See, e.g., LA. CiV. CODE arts. 281-291 (as they appeared prior to their repeal by 1960 La.
Acts, No. 30, S 2) and LA. R.S. 9:651 (1950) ("In all matters ... the family meeting shall
be abolished.").
19. See Brewton v. Brewton, 159 La. 251, 105 So. 307 (1925) (judge used his discre-
tionary power to give custody of child of tender years to mother). "[U]nless the judge
shall for the greater advantage of the children, order that some or all of them shall
be entrusted to the care of the other party." LA. CIv. CODE art. 157 (as amended by
1921 La. Acts, Ex. Sess., No. 38). This amendment eliminated the requirement that
a family meeting be called to advise the judge and authorized this action.
20. See Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C.D.
L. REV. 523, 530-32 (1979); Lemon, Joint Custody as a Statutory Presumption, 11 GOLDEN
GATE 485, 485-86 (1981); Trombetta, Joint Custody: Recent Research and Overloaded Court-
rooms Inspire New Solutions to Custody Disputes, 19 J. FAM. L. 213, 215 (1980-81).
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father was gradually eroded." 1 As the mother became the primary
care-giver to children, custody decisions increasingly reflected the
assumption that her influence on them was paramount to their
well-being.2 The "maternal preference rule," combined with the
"tender years doctrine," 2 became a strong presumption in Louisiana'
and other states,25 requiring the father to prove the mother unfit if
he wished to have custody. In Louisiana, when the doctrine of mater-
nal preference was balanced against the statutory preference favor-
ing the spouse who obtained the divorce, most courts found that the
21. M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT: THE CASE FOR JOINT CUSTODY
30 (1978).
22. Id. at 37-38; Foster & Freed, Joint Custody, 15 TRIAL 27, (1979); See e.g., Ward
v. Ward, 88 Ariz. 130, 353 P.2d 895 (1960); Dorsett v. Dorsett, 281 A.2d 290 (D.C. App.
1971); Krieger v. Krieger, 59 Idaho 301, 81 P.2d 1081 (1938); Eisel v. Eisel, 261 Minn.
1, 110 N.W.2d 881 (1961); Kirstukas v. Kirstukas, 14 Mo. App. 190, 286 A.2d 535 (1972);
Baird v. Baird, 21 N.J. Eq. 384 (1869); Weiss v. Weiss, 53 Misc. 2d 262, 278 N.Y.S.2d
61 (1967); Lyle v. Lyle, 86 Tenn. 372, 6 S.W. 878 (1888); cf. Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994
(Utah 1975).
23. British Infants Custody Act, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., ch. 54. Basically the tender
years doctrine presumes that the nursing infant requires its mother's care for sustenance
and that the very young child requires a quality of love, attention and affection which
only its mother has the patience and ability to give. See, e.g., Harmon v. Harmon,
264 Ky. 315, 94 S.W.2d 670 (1936); Helms v. Franciscus, 2 BI. Ch. 544 (Md. 1830); Esposito
v. Esposito, 41 N.J. 143, 195 A.2d 295 (1963); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 173 Wis. 592, 181
N.W. 826 (1921). Louisiana cases expressing the "tender years" doctrine include: Black
v. Black, 205 La. 861, 18 So. 2d 321, 323 (1944) ("They are both girls of tender years
and need a mother's constant care and attention."); Carlson v. Carlson, 140 So. 2d
801, 803 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ("The law ... is well-settled in the rules that it
is to the best interest of young children, particularly girls, that custody be awarded
to the mother."); and McManus v. McManus, 250 So. 2d 498, 501 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1971) ("Especially is the paramount right of the mother recognized where the custody
of children of tender years is involved.").
24. LA. CIV. CODE art. 146 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 718, S 1) ("[It
shall be granted to the wife ...."). The reversal of the preference in the provisional
custody article is the most obvious example, but the jurisprudence also demonstrates
the almost irrefutable nature of the presumption. See, e.g., Sampognaro v. Sampognaro,
215 La. 631, 41 So. 2d 456 (1949); Cannon v. Cannon, 225 La. 874, 74 So. 2d 147, (1954);
White v. Broussard, 206 La. 25, 18 So. 2d 641 (1944); Jones v. Jones, 344 So. 2d 414
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Williams v. Mabry, 246 So. 2d 69 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971);
Nugent v. Nugent, 232 So. 2d 521 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Douglas v. Douglas, 146
So. 2d 227 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
25. See, e.g., Washburn v. Washburn, 49 Cal. App. 2d 581, 122 P.2d 96 (1942); Averch
v. Averch, 104 Colo. 365, 90 P.2d 962 (1939); Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1938). Some states codified the maternal preference rule in their statutes as a
standard or presumption. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 14-846 (before amended in
1973); CAL. CIV. CODE S 318 (before repealed in 1972); UTAH CODE ANN. S 30-340 (1969).
For an exhaustive listing of cases involving the "tender years doctrine" and its effect
on the "maternal preference rule," see Roth, Tender Years Presumption, 15 J. FAM.
LAW 423 (1976-77).
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best interests of the child dictated that custody be awarded to the
mother.' This was true even in some cases in which the father had
obtained the divorce on grounds of the mother's adultery. There were
a few situations in which the mother might be denied custody: (1)
when the mother was mentally unfit to care for children,28 (2) when
the mother failed to provide a healthy and wholesome home at-
mosphere for the children,29 (3) when the mother indicated by open
and flagrant adultery that she was morally unfit," or (4) when the
mother abandoned the home and made no attempt to seek custody
of the children.3
The exceptions to the maternal preference rule gradually became
more frequent;"2 courts began to take tentative steps away from
reliance on maternal preference as a "bright line" rule, while moving
in the direction of analysis of multiple factors to help determine the
actual "best interest of the child."'31 Many states codified the best in-
26. See, e.g., Abreo v. Abreo, 281 So. 2d 695 (1973); Estes v. Estes, 261 La. 20,
258 So. 2d 857 (1972); Jones v. Timber, 247 So. 2d 207 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); Brown
v. Brown, 180 So. 2d 106 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
27. See, e.g., Fulco v. Fulco, 259 La. 1122, 254 So. 2d 603 (1971); Estopinal v.
Estopinal, 223 La. 485, 66 So. 2d 311 (1953); Lovell v. Lovell, 205 So. 2d 470 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1967); Brown v. Brown, 180 So. 2d 106 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965); McCaa v. McCaa,
163 So. 2d 434, writ denied 165 So. 2d 480 (1964).
28. See, e.g., Richard v. Richard, 359 So. 2d 696 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied
360 So. 2d 198 (1978).
29. See, e.g., Whatley v. Whatley, 312 So. 2d 149 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975); Nethken
v. Nethken, 292 So. 2d 923 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974), affd 307 So. 2d 563 (La. 1975);
Blackburn v. Blackburn, 168 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
30. See, e.g., McCurdy v. McCurdy, 369 So. 2d 1216 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979); Schex-
nayder v. Schexnayder, 364 So. 2d 1318, (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978), rev'd 371 So. 2d
769 (1979); Johnson v. Johnson, 268 So. 2d 114 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); Tuggle v. Tug-
gle, 235 So. 2d 166 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); Murray v. Murray, 220 So. 2d 790 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1969), writ .denied 254 La. 290, 223 So. 2d 411 (1969); Poole v. Poole,
189 So. 2d 75 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied 249 La. 719, 190 So. 2d 235 (1968).
31. See, e.g., Ard v. Ard, 210 La. 869, 28 So. 2d 461 (1946).
32. Note that most of the cases cited in notes 26-29, supra, were decided within
the last decade, indicating a gradual movement away from the strict application of
the maternal preference rule.
33. The "best interest of the child" has been the stated standard for custody deci-
sions at least since the early 19th century. "[T]he courts will exercise a sound discre-
tion for the benefit of the children .... W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 451 n.10;
" . . a moins que le tribunal, sur la demande de la famille ou du ministere public
n'ordonne pour le plus grand advantage des enfants, que tous ou quelgues-un d'eux seront
confies aux soins soit de 'autre epoux . . ." NOUVEAU CODE CIV., supra note 11, art.
302 (emphasis added). See Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5 Binn. 520 (Pa. 1813) & Chap-




terest standard in their statutes,' and some listed various inquiries
to be made by the court in applying this test. 5 In Louisiana, this stan-
dard, though not yet codified, was used to mitigate the otherwise rigid
application of article 157, which required the grant of custody to the
spouse who obtained the, divorce.3" The strength of the maternal
preference rule was so great, however, that even when a number
of factors were evaluated, the scales usually tipped in favor of the
mother." For many judges, the "best interest" standard was inex-
tricably bound up with the maternal preference rule, such that in-
evitably it was considered in the best interest of a child to be with
the mother. 8
Recent increased attention to equal rights has fostered a reevalua-
tion of the statutory scheme controlling divorce and custody.39
The feminist movement and the civil rights movement forced courts
to discard some of the presumptions which had resulted in unequal
or discriminatory treatment." In response, most states amended their
custody statutes"' and judges were forced to justify their custody deci-
34. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE S 4600(b) (West Supp. 1982) ("according to the best in-
terest of the child"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., S 46b-56(b) (West Supp. 1982) ("the court
shall be guided by the best interest of the child"); HAWAII REV. STAT. S 571-46(1) (Supp.
1981) ("according to the best interests of the child"); KANS. STAT. ANN. S 60-1610(b)
(1976) ("the court shall consider the best interest of such children to be paramount");
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208 S 31 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1982) ("the happiness and welfare
of the children shall determine their custody or possession").
35. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. S 403.270 (Baldwin Supp. 1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. S 722.23 (Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 518.17(1) (West 1982).
36. See text at note 24, supra.
37. See, e.g., Partin v. Partin, 339 So. 2d 450 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied 341
So. 2d 419 (La. 1976); Note, A Case For Joint Custody After the Parents' Divorce, 17
J. FAM. LAW 741, 748 (1978-79).
38. "Probably most judges sincerely believe that children ... properly and naturally
belong with their mothers, and that it would be contrary to their best interests to
award . . . custody to the father unless the mother is shown to be unfit." Foster &
Freed, supra note 22, at 27.
39. Brosky & Alford, supra note 4, at 683-84; Folberg & Graham, supra note 20,
at 534; Note, supra note 5, at 107-08; Note, Maternal Preference and the Double Burden:
Best Interest of Whom?, 38 LA. L. REV. 1096, 1099-1102 (1978).
40. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (Alabama statute allowing alimony only to women
violated equal protection clause of 14th amendment); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(test for gender-based classification established); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (classifications by sex are inherently suspect); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
(Iowa statute preferring men over women as estate administrators held unconstitu-
tional). See generally Solomon, The Father's Revolution in Custody Cases, 13 TRIAL 33
(1977). But see Broussard v. Broussard, 320 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975) (court
upheld the constitutionality of the maternal preference rule).
41. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. S 60-1610(b) (1976) ("either parent shall be considered
19821
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sions in the light of these new provisions."2 The Louisiana Legislature
reacted to this trend by amending article 157 in 1977 to specifically
permit permanent custody awards to either the husband or wife." This
rejected by implication the prior "fault-based" criteria" and made it
appear that the "best interest of the child" standard was to be the
sole criterion for custody awards.45 In Act 718 of the 1979 regular ses-
sion, the legislature strengthened the "equal right to custody" provi-
sion in article 157 by adding the words "without any preference be-
ing given on the basis of the sex of the parent."' This act also amend-
ed the provisional custody article to eliminate the maternal preference
it had expressed. 7 Subsequent Louisiana decisions interpreted these
changes as clear signals of the legislative intent to overturn the mater-
nal preference rule. 8
Perhaps in response to the new freedom from rigid maternal
to have a vested interest in the custody of any such child as against the other parent");
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. S 403.270(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1979) ("and equal consideration shall be
given to each parent"); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208 S 31 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1982)
("the rights of the parents shall, in the absence of misconduct, be held to be equal");
1981 MINN. SESS. LAW SERV. S 518.17 subd. 3 (West) ("and shall not prefer one parent
over the other solely on the basis of the sex of the parent").
42. Fujikane v. Fujikane, 61 Hawaii 352, 604 P.2d 43 (1979); State v. Al-Turck,
220 Kan. 557, 552 P.2d 1375 (1976); Thompson v. Thompson, 382 So. 2d 1036 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1980); Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1973) (New York
court rejected the "tender years" presumption as sex discrimination).
43. 1977 La. Acts, No. 448, S 1: "In all cases of separation and divorce, permanent
custody of the child or children shall be granted to the husband or the wife, in accor-
dance with the best interest of the child or children."
44. See note 16, supra.
45. Comment, Selected Legislation of the 1979 Regular Session-A Student Commen-
tary, 40 LA. L. REV. 473 (1980). In spite of the clear implication of the amendment, the
Louisiana circuit courts were split as to whether the 1977 amendment abrogated or
codified the maternal preference rule. Id. at 475. Later amendments eliminated any
possible confusion.
46. 1979 La. Acts, No. 718, S 1.
47. 1979 La. Acts, No. 718, S 1: "If there are children of the marriage, whose
provisional keeping is claimed by both husband and wife, . . . it shall be granted to
the husband or the wife, in accordance with the best interest of the children."
Act 718 also added to article 146 the requirement that, "[in all cases, the court shall
inquire into the fitness of both the mother and the father and shall award custody
to the parent the court finds will in all respects be in accordance with the best in-
terest of the child or children." See text at notes 12-14, supra.
48. "It could hardly be more clear that the legislative intent is to do away with
any legal preference or presumption in favor of the mother in custody disputes. The
father and mother stand on equal footing at the outset .... Thornton v. Thornton,
377 So. 2d 417, 420 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979); "Louisiana Civil Code article 146 . .. and
article 157 ...were amended in 1979 to eliminate any legal preference in favor of
the mother in custody disputes." Burch v. Burch, 398 So. 2d 84, 86 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 43
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preference or perhaps as a reaction to the changing demographics
of family life in the United States,49 courts in many states began to
allow divorcing couples to experiment with alternatives to sole
custody." These alternatives have been variously described as co-
parenting, split custody, divided custody, alternate custody, and joint
custody." Regardless of the label affixed to them, these agreements
usually include two distinct elements: each parent retains his or her
legal rights and responsibilities with respect to the children, and each
parent retains sufficient access or physical contact with the children
so that his or her parent-child relationship can be sustained.5' Increas-
ingly, parents are asserting and courts are agreeing that joint custody,
rather than sole custody, is in the best interest of the child.
Controversy Over Joint Custody
No consensus of opinion has arisen concerning alternative custody
arrangements. 5  Some strong arguments against joint custody,
49. "Over 10 million children under 18-one out of every six children under the
age of 18-live in single parent families, most of which are headed by women.
• * * In families headed by women in 1975, (over 50%) . . . of the mothers . . . were
in the labor force." Bratt, Joint Custody, 67 Ky. L.J. 271, 274 (1978-79).
50. See, e.g., Dunbar v. Dunbar, 102 Ariz. 352, 429 P.2d 949, app. after remand
109 Ariz. 395, 510 P.2d 41 (1967); Braeman v. Braeman, 192 Neb. 510, 222 N.W.2d 811
(1974); Mayer v. Mayer, 150 N.J. Sup. 556, 376 A.2d 214 (1977); Rice v. Rice, 603 P.2d
1125 (Okla. 1979).
51. See Merrill v. Merrill, 167 Cal. App. 2d 423, 334 P.2d 583 (1959) ("divided"
custody used to describe traditional sole custody with extensive visitation); Schillemann
v. Schillemann, 61 Mich. App. 446, 232 N.W.2d 737 (1975) ("split or alternating" custody);
Ramey,, Stender & Smaller, Joint Custody: Are Two Homes Better Than One?, 8 GOLDEN
GATE 559, 559-60 (1979); Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 697 (1963).
52. M. MORGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, JOINT CUSTODY: AN ALTERNATIVE FOR DIVORCING
FAMILIES 30 (1981); M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 21, at 119; Foster & Freed, supra
note 22, at 28; Comment, California's Presumption Favoring Joint Custody, 17 CAL.
W.L. REV. 286, 295 (1981).
53. A strong statement favoring the use of joint custody can be found in Perroti
v. Perroti, 78 Misc. 2d 131, 135, 355 N.Y.S.2d 68, 72-73 (1974): "The string of security
and stability that would flow from mother to child to father, with joint custody as
the emotional fulcrum, would but strengthen the parent-child unit in what otherwise
could be a completely destroyed marital home." A very early recognition of some of
the benefits of joint custody is found in Mullen v. Mullen, 188 Va. 259, 272,•49 S.E.2d
349, 355 (1948), in which the court stated: "It gives the child the experience of two
separate homes. The child is entitled to the love, advice and training of both her father
and her mother. Frequent association, contact, and friendly relations with both of her
parents will protect her future welfare if one of her parents should die." On the other
hand, the court in Richardson v. Richardson, 72 Idaho 19, 23, 236 P.2d 718, 720-21
(1951) stated, "[Clourts should avoid, when possible, a division of the control of a child
between the parents, because it is hardly possible for a child to grow up and live
a normal, happy life under such circumstances." The idea that such division of control
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however, have been made. Probably the most common such argument
is what might be called the "yo-yo" argument-it is not good for the
child to be shuttled back and forth between two homes.' The argu-
ment postulates that such movement of the child involves not only
a physical dislocation for him, but also a mental disorientation because
of the parents' conflicting sets of behavior expectations.55 Proponents
of alternative custody arrangements have generally agreed that if the
parents cannot work out a reasonable logistical setup, joint custody
may not be workable." For instance, most recommend that school-
age children not be switched from one school to another; as a conse-
quence, divided custody has often been on a nine months/three months
basis 7 or has required both parents to be within commuting distance
of the child's school.'
Another major argument against joint custody is that it is illogical
to expect two people who could not get along during marriage to sud-
is never good for the child was strongly expressed in BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD, whose authors contend that a child cannot relate in a healthy way to two con-
flicting adults. They recommended that, in all custody dispositions, one parent should
maintain exclusively his parental rights and the other parent should be essentially
excluded from the child's life. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, 37-38 (1973). The split in opinion occurs also among other pro-
fessionals working with families, as evidenced by Parley, Joint Custody: A Lawyer's
Perspective, 53 CONN. B.J. 310 (1979) which is highly favorable to joint custody, and on
the other side, Levy & Chambers, The Folly of Joint Custody, 69 ILL. B.J. 412 (1981),
which refers to joint custody as a "placebo."
54. "It is argued that joint custody between parents usually requires that 'shut-
tling back and forth' of the children which must inevitably lead to the lack of stability
in home environment which children require." This was only one of many factors con-
sidered by the court in an extremely well-written and carefully reasoned decision.
Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 645-46, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (1978). "Children need
a home base." Braiman v. Braiman, 407 N.Y.S.2d 449, 451 (1978); "Nothing can be more
demoralizing . . . than to have children . . . going from one home to another each
month." Towles v. Towles, 176 Ky. 225, 228, 195 S.W. 437, 438 (Ky. Ct. App. 1917).
55. In rejecting any divided custody awards, Louisiana courts consistently
reiterated the idea that children should not be subjected to a division of authority
over them. Woods v. Woods, 253 So. 2d 230 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971); Ogden v. Ogden,
220 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Bowlin v. Bowlin, 222 So. 2d 637 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1969). Other courts have also referred to the detrimental results of conflicting
authority figures. Phillips v. Phillips, 153 Fla. 133, 13 So. 2d 922 (1943); Dunn v. Dunn,
217 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.1949); M. MORGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, supra note 52, at 70-71.
56. M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 21, at 118; Foster & Freed, supra note 22,
at 27 & 31.
57. See Henning v. Henning, 89 Ariz. 330, 362 P.2d 124 (1961); Dworkis v. Dworkis,
111 So. 2d 70 (Fla. App. 3d Dist. 1959); Kinch v. Kinch, 168 Neb. 110, 95 N.W.2d 319
(1959).
58. See Mansfield v. Mansfield, 230 Minn. 574, 42 N.W.2d 315 (1950); Larson v.
Larson, 176 Minn. 490, 223 N.W. 789 (1929).
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denly become cooperative in joint decision-making for their children. 9
On the other hand, proponents suggest that the adversary nature of
custody disputes aggravates the already tense situation which faces
a divorcing couple, and joint custody will alleviate this strife."' When
a couple has agreed to joint custody, there is no winner or loser. Each
parent maintains legal parental rights without being forced to prove
that the other is unfit.6 ' However, even the strongest advocates of
joint custody agree that its feasibility is enhanced if the parents can
separate the shattered husband-wife relationship from the intact
parent-child relationship.2
59. See Levy & Chambers, supra note 53, at 418; Folberg & Graham, supra note
20, at 549; Note, Joint Custody: A Revolution in Child Custody Law?, 20 WASH. L.J.
326, 334-35 (1981).
60. J. NOBLE & W. NOBLE, THE CUSTODY TRAP 160 (1975) ("If custodial care were
to be considered a joint responsibility in divorce, as it is in marriage, there would
be less opportunity for enmity to replace cooperation.") (quoted in Folberg & Graham,
supra note 20, at 550). A similar viewpoint is expressed by Morgenbesser and Nehls:
"Joint custody may actually enhance the relationship between divorcing parents. A
custody fight is avoided and child-rearing remains a mutual task which necessitates
cooperation, communication and respect." J. MORGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, supra note 52,
at 66.
61. Realistically, however, if both parents have an equal statutory right to custody,
the courts must examine and compare the fitness of both parents in order to reach
a decision. The Michigan custody statute, for instance, lists a number of factors which
must be used by the judge in deciding what constitutes the best interest of the child.
Among them are:
(a) the love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the parties in-
volved and the child.
(b) the capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love,
affection and guidance and continuation of the educating and raising of the
child in its religion or creed, if any.
() the moral fitness of the parties involved.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 722.23 (Supp. 1982). Evaluation of these factors necessarily in-
volves comparison and could tend to encourage each to disparage the fitness of the
other. Fortunately, these are only a few of the relevant inquiries to be made by the
judge according to the Michigan statute, which is comprehensive and well-balanced.
Louisiana courts have repeatedly stated that the relative "fitness" of the parents is
a determinative factor. Article 146 requires that "in all cases, the court shall inquire
into the fitness of both the mother and father .. " LA. Civ. CODE art. 146. Conse-
quently, comparisons of this nature are inevitable in Louisiana when the court must
choose one parent over the other.
62. Grief, Joint Custody: A Sociological Study, 15 TRIAL 32, 33 (1979). The author
described a study of joint custody conducted in metropolitan New York in 1976-77.
One of the conclusions was that even parents whose relationship with each other was
hostile and recriminatory could learn to separate "their marital issues from the paren-
tal issues." This was possible if each loved the child enough to put up with the in-
convenience of contact with the other and if each recognized that the child was safe
and well cared for with the other parent. California has established conciliation courts
which are available to parents who find that they are unable to agree upon a major
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A third potential problem with joint custody arrangements in-
volves the remarriage or relocation of one or both parents. The parent
seeking to remarry or relocate may find himself in a serious predica-
ment, forced to choose between his child and his new job or new
relationship. 3 Some courts have found remarriage or relocation a
"material change in circumstances" which would justify a modifica-
tion of the custody award. 4 Other courts have used the relocation
of one spouse to justify an award of divided custody, such that each
parent is full custodian for a portion of the year, reasoning that great
distance between the parents would make visitation impractical." Some
states have dealt with these potential problems by statutory conflict-
resolution methods.6
In spite of the problem areas, there are many reasons why joint
custody is a preferred alternative to sole custody with visitation. The
most important argument in favor of joint custody is that it allows
the child to have a continuing, regular relationship with both parents.67
Sociologists and psychologists have emphasized that the child's pro-
per gender identification is enhanced by regular contact with his
mother and father, who serve as appropriate role models. Although
decision concerning the child. CAL. CiV. CODE art. 4600.5(f) (West Supp. 1982) ("the par-
ties may . .. consult with the conciliation court ... to resolve any controversy . . .").
63. In re Osborn, 604 P.2d 954 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (court denied mother's re-
quest to move from Seattle to Iowa to accept a new job, reasoning that joint custody
implied a continuing relationship with the father). However, this choice may face the
custodial parent in a sole custody situation also. In Thompson v. Thompson, 338 So.
2d 1186 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976), the father unsuccessfully sought a change in custody
because the mother was away from the children several nights each week spending
time with her boyfriend. And in Lloyd v. Lloyd, 313 So. 2d 854 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975),
the husband sought to impose a geographical restriction on the custody agreement
when the wife indicated her intent to move to Florida to remarry.
64. Ramsden v. Ramsden, 32 Wash. 2d 603, 202 P.2d 920 (1949) (remarriage of
mother constitutes a material change in circumstances for court to consider); cf. Broom-
field v. Broomfield, 283 So. 2d 839 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973) (court can allow custodian
to move to another state if custodian had good reason to relocate and it is in best
interest of the child).
65. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 351 S.W.2d 192 (Ky. 1961); Patrick v. Patrick, 17 Wis.
2d 434, 117 N.W. 2d 256 (1962).
66. The California statute refers such questions to conciliation courts. CAL. CIV.
CODE 4600.5(f) (West Supp. 1982). Lacking this alternative, the parties may agree to sub-
mit controversies to arbitration. Trombetta, supra note 20, at 228.
67. "[Elvery such child is entitled to the love, nurture, advice, and training of
both father and mother ...... Brock v. Brock, 123 Wash. 450, 452, 212 P. 550, 551
(1923); "Since the child is entitled to the love, advice and training of both father and
mother, divided custody is not wrong in principle if the best interests of the child
are thereby subserved." Sneed v. Sneed, 248 Ala. 88, 26 So. 2d 561, 562 (1946).
68. See Trombetta, supra note 20 at 219; "The research on children of divorce
clearly indicates that those children do best who have open and continuous access
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extensive visitation rights theoretically accomplish this effect, studies
have indicated that the non-custodial parent gradually becomes less
involved with the child.' This inevitably leads to a "loss" of one parent
for the child, inducing trauma similar to that suffered at the death
of a loved one. 0 This feeling is intensified if the child feels guilt from
being forced to make an emotional or physical choice of one parent
over the other." Joint custody can avoid this anguish for the child,
because he is allowed to "keep" both parents and does not have to
choose one and lose the other."2
Another favorable aspect of joint custody is that divorcing parents
are not as tempted to use the child as a "pawn" in their negotiations.
If one parent does not "win" the child, neither does the other parent
"lose" the child; thus, both parents are allowed to retain dignity in
the separation and divorce process. Also, a major source of leverage
available to the sole custodial parent is removed; one parent no longer
has power over the visitation privileges of the other.74 In the past,
the non-custodial parent had few legal rights with respect to the child
and had to resort to the courts to enforce those rights he did have."5
to both parents." Grief, supra note 62, at 33; "As ... studies . . . show again and
again, those children who fared best after the divorce were those who were free to
develop loving and full relationships with both parents." M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra
note 21, at 69.
69. As a practical matter, if a court does not allow a father to have the custody
of a child part of the time it is probable that his interest in the child will gradually
fade, and the mother may have difficulty in collecting alimony and child support. Annot.
92 A.L.R.2d 559, 705; "Fathers regularly ignore their court-ordered responsibility for
child support payments. Apparently, they feel they have not only divorced their wives,
but also their children." Bratt, supra note 49, at 275; Grief, supra note 62 at 32.
70. "The children often feel abandoned and rejected. It shakes their basic sense
of security to see someone they have loved and trusted gone from their lives." Bratt,
supra note 49, at 297; "Many of their (children's) problems are related to the perceived
loss of one parent typically resulting from sole custody arrangements." M. MORGENBESSER
& N. NEHLS, supra note 52, at 60.
71. "Joint custody removes the feeling that a child needs to make such a choice."
M. MORGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, supra note 52, at 64. The child "sees that he can love
one parent without being disloyal to the other." Note, supra note 59, at 333-34. See
also Trombetta, supra note 20, at 231.
72. Note, supra note 59, at 333-34. The article cites a study of 165 Michigan children
in grades three through six from both divorced and intact families. A majority of the
children indicated a preference for joint custody with physical custody alternating twice
weekly. Id. at 334 n.66.
73. M. MORGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, supra note 52, at 66.
74. "If anything, sole custody exacerbates parental conflict and the children are
often used by the mother as a club." M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 21, at 117.
75. As the court stated in Johnson v. Johnson, 214 La. 912, 922, 39 So. 2d 340,
343 (1949), it is always preferable for the parents to mutually agree on the question
of the father's right to visitation, "without the necessity of forcing one or the other
to apply to the court for modification . ..."
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With joint custody, if one parent proves uncooperative in carrying
out the agreement, the court may decide to grant sole custody to the
other parent." This would reward good-faith efforts to make joint
custody work and discourage a "tug-of-war" situation with the child
in the middle.
Aside from its impact on the child, joint custody may also work
to the advantage of both parents. In sole custody, the custodial parent
bears alone the burden of decision-making, emotional support, and
physical care of the child.7 Also, the sole custodian usually has to
work to support the children adequately. 8 The imposition on the
custodial parent's time and energy often leaves little opportunity to
develop new relationships with other adults. 9 Joint custody offers
some relief from this problem. Both parents are available to share
the difficult decisions; both contribute some of their emotional and
physical energies to the child; both are involved in the daily discipline,
education, and development of the child.' Also, because each parent
has some "time-out" while the other is caring for the child, both should
find it easier to pursue their own interests and establish or maintain
friendships. 1
Joint custody relieves the trauma which is usually experienced
by the non-custodial parent.2 Because neither parent "loses" his child,
there is not this additional source of distress during and after the
76. A preliminary draft of the California statute included the statement that when
modification of joint custody is sought, "The court may consider, among other factors,
evidence of any substantial or repeated failure of a parent to adhere to the plans
.... .CAL. S.B. 477 (1979-80), quoted in Lemon, supra note 20 at 493-94 n.48. Although
this factor was not included in the final draft of the California statute, one director
of the Conciliation Court of Los Angeles County has expressed the opinion that if
joint custody breaks down because of the intransigence of one party, sole custody
will be awarded to the party who did not cause the failure. Folberg & Graham, supra
note 20, at 551.
77. See M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 21, at 73-79. The authors list numerous
problems faced by the sole custodian. These include for mothers: the economic pro-
blem caused by being forced to take a job which is usually at low-pay; and for fathers
or mothers: the need for child care services during working hours, sole decision-making
responsibility, possible deterioration of the parent-child relationship as one parent tries
to fill all roles, discipline problems, lack of a social life with adults, lack of intimacy,




80. See Folberg & Graham, supra note 20, at 553-56; Bratt, supra note 49, at 301.
81. Id.
82. The reaction to this trauma has been a surge in "father's rights" advocates.
See Solomon, supra note 40, at 33.
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divorce. Neither parent is relegated to the status of a mere "visitor"
in his child's life.' Joint custody can alleviate the bitterness and resent-
ment commonly felt by non-custodial parents whose parental rights
have been curtailed by a sole custody decree.
Joint custody is a relatively new phenomenon in the sense that
it has only recently attracted public attention and approbation. 4 Con-
sequently, it remains to be seen whether joint custody really is a
viable, practicable alternative for most divorcing couples or whether
it will remain an unusual choice which only the rare couple is able
to actuate and maintain. Both its proponents and opponents await fur-
ther experimentation by divorcing parents to determine the viability
and practicality of joint custody.
Experience of Other States
Statutory custody provisions of the states fall into four main
categories: (1) statutes which establish a presumption that joint custody
is in the best interest of the child in certain circumstances, (2) statutes
which mandate that joint custody be considered before sole custody,86
(3) statutes which merely allow joint custody as a possible alternative,8 7
83. Many visitation provisions indicate that the non-custodial parent has extremely
limited access to the child. See, e.g., Litton v. Litton, 299 So. 2d 458 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1974) (visitation was limited to one weekend per month, Christmas every other
year, and two weeks during summer). And in Ogden v. Odgen, 220 So. 2d 241 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1969), the court held that visitation rights of father for the first and
third weekends of each month was excessive and amounted to prohibited divided
custody.
84. Though a few courts have experimented with divided custody in one form
or another, most of the statutory provisions have been enacted since 1979, and most
of the articles and books also have been written since then. See, e.g., CONN. STAT. ANN.
S 46b-56 (Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. S 571.46 (Supp. 1982).
85. "Presumptive" joint custody is established in: CAL. CIV. CODE art. 4600.5 (West
1982) ("where the parents have agreed"); CONN GEN. STAT. ANN. 46b-56 (as amended
by Pub. Act 81-402) ("where the parents have agreed ... or so agree in open court");
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 722.26a (1982) (this statute is almost a mandate: (1) "In custody
disputes, the parents shall be advised of joint custody," (2) "If the parents agree on
joint custody, the court shall award joint custody.").
86. "First" joint custody is found in: CAL. CIV. CODE art. 4600(b) (West Supp. 1982)
("in the following order of preference . . . (1) to both parents jointly ... or to either
parent") & N.M. STAT. ANN. S 40-4-9.1 (Supp. 1982) ("the court should first consider an
award of joint custody").
87. These are: HAWAII REV. STAT. S 571-46 & 571-46.1 (Supp. 1982) ("to either parent
or to both parents"); IOWA CODE ANN. S 598.21 (Supp. 1981) ("may provide for joint
custody"); KAN. STAT. ANN. S 60-1610(b) (1976) ("or the court may give the custody of such
children to the parties jointly"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin Supp. 1981) S 403.270(3)
("may grant joint custody to the child's parents."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 S 752
(Supp. 1982) ("may declare that the parents shall have joint custody"); MINN. STAT.
1982]
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and (4) statutes which contain no specific statement concerning joint
custody.8
Prior to 1980, very few states had statutory statements concern-
ing joint custody; those states with such statements merely allowed
joint custody as an alternative to sole custody. However, in several
other states the courts occasionally allowed joint custody despite the
lack of specific authorization in their custody provisions. In others,
the courts looked upon any form of divided custody with disfavor and
interpreted their custody statutes as prohibiting it"' unless exceptional
circumstances were shown. Their reasoning usually took the form that
whatever was not expressly allowed was impliedly negated. It is dif-
ficult to draw any conclusions about joint custody's relative effec-
tiveness from the reported cases, even after canvassing decisions from
those states whose statutes or jurisprudence allow joint custody,
because only those cases in which a dispute arises return to court
for resolution. Consequently, the courts see and report only the small
percentage of cases in which custody arrangements have broken
down." Prior to the 1981 amendment, Louisiana courts categorically
ANN. S 518.003 (Supp. 1982) ("which shall be sole or joint"); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. S 125.134
(Supp. 1981) ("may grant custody to the parties jointly"); N. C. GEN. STAT. S 50-13.2
(1976) ("provide for custody in two or more of the same"); Tx. FAM. CODE ANN. S 14.06
(Vernon 1982) ("and appointment of joint managing conservators"); WIS. STAT. ANN.
FAM. CODE S 767.24 (Supp. 1982) ("may give the care and custody of the child to the par-
ties jointly if the parties so agree.").
88. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, S 31 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1982) (curiously, though
the 1981 amendment is entitled "Children-Joint Custody Orders Entry," the statute
itself does not specify joint custody but says, "where the parents have reached an
agreement providing for the custody of the children, the court may enter an order
in accordance with such agreement). See also ALA. CODE S 30-3-1 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
S 25-332 (Supp. 1982); COL. REV. STAT. S 14-13-102, 14-10-123 & 124 (Supp. 1982); DEL.
CODE ANN. S 13-721 et. seq. (Supp. 1981); CODE OF GA. ANN. S 30-127 (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN.
STAT. S 40-602 (Smith-Hurd 1981); MISS. CODE ANN. TIT. 93-5-23 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT.
ANN. S 9:2-1 et. seq. (Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 12-1277 (Supp. 1981-82); TENN.
CODE ANN. 36-828 (Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. 30-3-5 et. seq. and 30-5-1 (Supp. 1981);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 26.08.110 et. seq. (West Supp. 1982).
89. IOWA CODE ANN. S 598.21 (enacted in 1978-79); N.C. GEN. STAT. S 50-13.2 (enacted
in 1976); OR. REV. STAT. S 107.095 (enacted in 1977); WIS. STAT. ANN. S 247.24 (enacted
in 1978-79).
90. For an extensive list of the cases in which some form of divided custody has
been allowed by the courts, see Annot. 92 A.L.R.2d 696-745 (1963).
91. See. e.g., Nielsen v. Nielsen, 87 Idaho 578, 394 P.2d 887 (1964); Bienvenu v.
Bienvenu, 380 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. App. 3d Dist. 1980).
92. Bratt, supra, note 49, at 284: "Because of their very nature, shared custodial
arrangements where proposed by the parents and approved by the courts are not
appealed .... In such circumstances, .where one party has appealed the trial court's




rejected any form of custody which even resembled divided custody. 3
As a result, there are no recorded cases in Louisiana which can pro-
vide some idea of the success or failure of this type of arrangement.
Louisiana Statutes' Major Provisions
Under the new provisions of articles 146"4 and 157,11 joint custody
means that the parents "may share" the physical custody of the
93. See, e.g., Bowlin v. Bowlin, 222 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969); Ogden v.
Ogden, 220 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969). Although Louisiana courts could not
formally order joint custody, some Louisiana parents apparently achieved "de facto"
joint custody by agreement. Legal custody had to be awarded to one or the other
parent, but the court might allow parents to establish details of a visitation arrange-
ment approximating joint custody. Hansen, Joint Custody Done Informally in Loui-
siana, State-Times, April 4, 1980, at 3-B.
94. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146:
Custody of children pending the litigation.
A. If there are children of the marriage whose provisional keeping is claimed
by both husband and wife, the suit being yet pending and undecided, it shall
be granted to the husband or the wife in accordance with the best interest
of the children, or if both husband and wife agree to joint custody and the
court deems it in the best interest of the children, the court may award
joint custody. In all cases, the court shall inquire into the fitness of both
the mother and father and shall award custody to such parent or to both
parents, if they agree to joint custody, as the court finds will in all respects
be in accordance with the best interest of the child or children. Such custody
hearing may be held in private chambers of the judge.
B. An award of joint custody shall be made only when both husband and wife
are domiciled in the state of Louisiana. If either parent changes his or her
domicile to another state, the other may petition for sole custody. For pur-
poses of this article "joint custody" shall mean the husband and wife may
share the physical custody of children of the marriage and shall enjoy the
natural co-tutorship of such children in accordance with Article 250.
95. LA. Civ. CODE art. 157:
Custody and tutorship of children; visitation rights of grandparents.
A. In all cases of separation or divorce, and change of custody after an original
award, permanent custody of the child or children shall be granted to the
husband or the wife, or to both jointly by agreement of both the husband
and wife, in accordance with the best interest of the child or children; however,
an award of joint custody may be granted only when the husband and wife
are both domiciled in the state of Louisiana. If either parent changes his
or her domicile to another state the other may petition for sole custody.
No preference shall be given on the basis of the sex of the parent in cases
where custody is awarded to only one parent. Such custody hearing may
be held in private chambers of the judge.
B. In all cases in which the custody of the child or children is awarded to one
parent, the parent with legal custody shall of right become natural tutor
or tutrix of said child or children to the same extent and with the same
effect as if the other party had died. In all cases in which the custody of
the child or children is awarded jointly to both parents, they may share the
physical custody of the child or children and shall be entitled to become the
natural cotutors of such child or children in accordance with Article 250.
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children and "shall" enjoy" or be entitled to7 natural co-tutorship.
Several requirements must be met before the court can award joint
custody, either provisionally or permanently. These requirements are:
(1) both parents must agree to joint custody; 8 (2) the best interest
of the child must be met by such an award;" and (3) both parents
must be domiciled in Louisiana.1" Apparently, the court will not have
discretion to award joint custody when only one parent requests it"'
or to impose it when neither parent requests it,"' even if it appears
that the best interest of the child would be served thereby. All three
of these requirements must be met to satisfy the statutory standards.
According to article 250, the co-tutorship of the child will belong
to both parents upon an award of joint custody. °3 The statutory defini-
tion of co-tutorship is that both parents shall have "equal authority,
privileges and responsibilities" with regard to the minor child.0" This
96. LA. CIV. CODE art. 146.
97. LA. Civ. CODE art. 157.
98. LA. CirV. CODE art. 146 ("if both husband and wife agree to joint custody"); LA.
CIv. CODE art. 157 ("or to both jointly by agreement of both the husband and wife").
99. LA. CiV. CODE art. 146 ("and the court deems it in the best interest of the
children"); LA. CiV. CODE art. 157 ("in accordance with the best interest of the child or
children").
100. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146 ("shall be made only when both husband and wife are
domiciled in the state of Louisiana"); LA. Civ. CODE, art. 157 ("may be granted only when
the husband and wife are both domiciled in the state of Louisiana").
101. Court imposed joint custody is strongly recommended in Danzig, Presumptive
Joint Custody, 105 N.J.L.J. 289 (April 3, 1980). Danzig reasons that the imposition
of joint custody when only one parent or neither parent requests it cannot be any
worse than the imposition of sole custody to one parent when both have requested
it. He concludes that such an award will force both parents to overlook their personal
animosities in order to achieve the stated goal of all custody decisions, namely the
innocent child's welfare.
102. One court went so far as to impose joint custody because the parents were
so hostile that sole custody with visitation was not workable. Therefore, each parent
was given partial or divided custody. Scott v. Scott, 240 Pa. Super. 65, 368 A.2d 288
(1976).
103. LA. CirV. CODE art. 250.
Upon the death of either parent, the tutorship of minor children belongs of right
to the other. Upon divorce or judicial separation from bed and board of parents,
the tutorship of each minor child belongs of right to the parent under whose
care he or she has been placed or to whose care he or she has been entrusted;
however, if the parents are awarded joint custody of a minor child, then the cotutor-
ship of the minor child shall belong to both parents, with equal authority, privileges,
and responsibilities, unless modified by agreement of the parents and approved
by the court awarding joint custody.
All those cases are called tutorship by nature.
104. LA. Civ. CODE art. 250.
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is similar to the definition of "joint legal custody" found in other states'
statutes.'
Potential Problems with Louisiana Joint Custody
Louisiana's new joint custody provisions pose several major poten-
tial problems. Lawyers and judges must be aware of gaps in this
legislation in order to minimize problems through carefully structured
joint custody arrangements. The statutes are broadly worded;
therefore, substantial jurisprudential interpretation and clarification
will be required. The areas addressed in the following discussion are:
(1) the lack of clear standards for joint custody, (2) the domicile restric-
tion, (3) natural co-tutorship, and (4) the joint custody agreement.
The Lack of Clear Standards for Joint Custody
The first problem facing lawyers and judges concerns the stan-
dards by which the custody decision will be made. The "best interest
of the child" is still the controlling standard for all custody awards,
including joint custody."°6 However, this is a vague and undefined stan-
dard which historically has been interpreted to accord with various
social theories and presumptions. 7 Several other states have provid-
ed guidelines to aid the court in deciding just what the "best interest
of a child" may be. 08 Lacking these, Louisiana judges will have to
establish some valid criteria upon which to base custody decisions.
A look at some of the specific factors listed in the statutes of other
states may provide direction for the Louisiana courts. The Kentucky
statute describes these factors as:
(a) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(b) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(c) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his
parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may
significantly affect the child's best interest;
(d) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community;
and
(e) the mental and physical health of all individuals included. °9
105. MINN. STAT. ANN. S 518.003, Subd. 3(b) (West Supp. 1982) (" 'Joint legal custody'
means that both parents have equal rights and responsibilities, including the right
to participate in major decisions determining the child's upbringing, including educa-
tion, health care and religious training.").
106. LA. Crv. CODE arts. 146 & 157.
107. See text at notes 32-38, supra.
108. See also MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. S 722.23 (Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 518.17,
subd. 1 (West Supp. 1982).
109. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. S 403.270 (Baldwin 1979).
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Though not required or enumerated in the Louisiana joint custody
legislation, consideration of all of the above factors would aid the
courts in determining in each case what actually is the "best interest
of the child." By providing such factors for consideration, the reliance
on a single presumption can be avoided.
One inquiry which is required by the Louisiana statute in all pro-
visional custody cases is an examination of the fitness of both the
mother and the father."' Unfortunately, the statute does not define
"fitness," nor does it suggest how these findings are to be applied
by the judge, other than to suggest that parental fitness is in some
way tied into the best interest of the child."' The jurisprudence
variously has interpreted this statutory fitness as physical,"'
economic,"' mental,"' or moral"' fitness, with emphasis on the latter.
But none of these factors, taken singly, is an adequate description
of fitness to act in the best interest of the child. It may be appropriate
to examine all of these qualities when making this evaluation. A
perplexing problem which has arisen in other states concerns gran-
ting joint custody when both parents are unfit. Some courts have
granted joint custody in such situations, 6 perhaps in the hope that
by lessening the burden on each parent, each will be better able to
fulfill his or her duties as a "part-time parent," although neither is
qualified to be sole custodian. However, it seems more reasonable to
avoid joint custody under these circumstances, because joint custody
exacerbates the child's difficulties by forcing him to endure a double
dose of poor parental influence."' Most proponents of joint custody"8
110. LA. CiV. CODE art. 146.
111. LA. CIV. CODE art. 146. Some courts have found that when both parents are fit,
this justifies an award of joint custody. See, e.g., Kilgore v. Kilgore, 54 Ala. App. 336,
308 So. 2d 249 (1975); Lewis v. Lewis, 217 Kan. 366, 537 P.2d 204 (1975); cf. Bronner
v. Bronner, 278 S.W.2d 530 (Tx. Civ. App. 1954).
112. Creed v. Moriarty, 244 So. 2d 286 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused 258 La. 351,
246 So. 2d 199 (1971).
113. In re Cole, 265 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
114. Miyagi v. Miyagi, 279 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 1st Cir), w-it refused 281 So. 2d
758 (1973).
115. Scrimsher v. Toler, 331 So. 2d 105 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
116. Stamper v. Stamper, 3 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2541 (Mich. Wayne County Cir.
Ct., 1977).
117. One Louisiana case indicated that when both parents were unfit, the mother
would get custody. Porter v. Porter, 295 So. 2d 860 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974). Another
awarded temporary custody in this circumstance to the grandparents, which was later
modified to give it to the "rehabilitated" mother. DeCelle v. DeCelle, 313 So. 2d 634
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
118. See Foster & Freed, supra note 22, at 28; Parley, supra note 53, at 319.
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envision it as a feasible option only when both parents are fit, and
the Louisiana statute can only be logically applied if the assumption
is made that both parents are required to be fit parents in order to
qualify for joint custody.
Finally, even if both parents are fit and the other statutory re-
quirements are met, there is no indication of how the court is to deter-
mine that joint custody, rather than sole custody, is in the best in-
terest of the child. Several states have established an evidentiary
presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the child when
both parents request it."9 Some states have also provided that an in-
vestigation or conciliation attempt can be ordered to assist the parents
and the judge in making this decision.20 Others have listed a number
of "best interest" factors and have specified additional inquiries to
be made in order to compare the relative advantages of sole and joint
custody.' The Minnesota statute, for example, lists these additional
factors as:
(a) the ability of parents to cooperate in the rearing of their
children;
(b) methods for resolving disputes regarding any major decision
concerning the life of the child, and the parents' willingness
to use those methods; and
(c) whether it would be detrimental to the child if one parent
were to have sole authority over the child's upbringing.'
An additional factor to be considered by the Louisiana judge involves
how carefully the parents have delineated the logistical arrangements
and division of responsibilities, since future conflicts in these areas
can be avoided. The Louisiana courts do not have the benefit of clear
statutory guidelines in comparing joint and sole custody, but selec-
tive "borrowing" of such factors from other jurisdictions can fill this
gap.
Domicile Restriction
The statutes' requirement that both parents be domiciled in
Louisiana'23 presents a second major problem. At first glance, this re-
119. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE S 4600.5 (West Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S
46b-56, sec. 2(b) (1981).
120. HAWAII REV. STAT. S 571-46.1 (Supp. 1981) (investigation); CAL. CIV. CODE S
4600.5(b) (investigation) and (f) (conciliation) (West Supp. 1981).
121. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 722.26a, sec. 6a(1)(a)& (b) (Supp. 1982).
122. MINN. STAT. ANN. S 518.17, subd. 2 (West Supp. 1982) (factors when joint custody
is sought) (added by amendment in ch. 349, 1981 Session, 72d Legislature).
123. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 146 & 157.
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quirement appears justifiable as a simple, common-sense way to make
shared physical custody easier for the child and parents. For instance,
if a particular custody agreement contemplates weekly transfers from
one home to the other, the parents must live within the same com-
munity or geographical area in order to minimize the transportation
problem and keep the child in one school." But if practical necessity
is the primary reason for the domicile requirement, the rationale is
undermined by the statutory definition of joint custody, which makes
shared physical custody discretionary, not mandatory.'25 As a prac-
tical matter, "same" domicile would seem to be unnecessary if the
joint custody agreement contemplates only a sharing of legal rights
and responsibilities with little or no sharing of physical custody. But
as a legal matter, this requirement has stronger justification. The most
probable reason for the Louisiana domicile requirement is the state's
interest in safeguarding the welfare of minor children domiciled in
the state. Continued supervision over the custodians and child is
facilitated if all remain Louisiana domiciliaries; domicile ensures that
Louisiana courts will be able to exercise jurisdiction over all the
parties.
Regardless of how it is justified, however, the limitation on
domicile appears to raise more questions than it solves. Both the pro-
visional and permanent custody statutes contain the stipulation that
"[ilf either parent changes his or her domicile to another state, the
other may petition for sole custody.""' The jurisprudential rule has
always been that either spouse may request a change in custody upon
a showing of materially altered circumstances,2 but the implication
of the new provision is that only the "staying" parent will have the
right to seek this modification of the custody arrangement. Narrowly
interpreted, this statutory language would give undue leverage to the
"staying" parent and would unnecessarily restrict the right of the
"4moving" parent to petition for sole custody, even when altered cir-
cumstances require the change of domicile in the best interest of the
124. See Kilgore v. Kilgore, 54 Ala. App. 336, 308 So. 2d 249 (1975) (the court noted
that shifting back and forth would usually be detrimental but due to the proximity
of the parents' homes in this case, the joint custody order was upheld).
125. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 146 & 157 (parents "may share" physical custody of the child).
126. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 146 & 157.
127. For a while, this change in circumstances was called the "double burden rule"
since it required a showing that conditions under which the child was presently living
were detrimental to him and that the applicant could provide a better environment.
Lagrone v. Lagrone, 311 So. 2d 290 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied 313 So. 2d 839
(La. 1975). However, a later decision indicated that this burden was no longer applicable.
Bordelon v. Bordelon, 381 So. 2d 871 (La. App. 3d Cir.), affd 390 So. 2d 1325 (La. 1980).
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child. The statutory .language is overly broad if given this construc-
tion by the courts.
In another sense, the statute is under-inclusive. The permissive
"may petition" language of the statute'28 leaves the door open for the
"staying" parent to consent to continuing joint custody in spite of the
other parent's move. By choosing not to petition for sole custody, the
"staying" parent can give tacit consent to the other's move. 2 ' Thus,
as a practical matter, the provision does little more than indicate
legislative disapproval of long-distance joint custody. Perhaps the pro-
vision should not be accorded any more weight than as such an ex-
pression of disapproval.
To remain consistent with the jurisprudence, each spouse should re-
tain the right to petition the court for sole custody. Such consistency
could be achieved by interpreting the "domicile" phrase as merely
permissive for the "staying" spouse, but not necessarily as denying
or limiting the right of the "moving" parent to so petition. By em-
phasizing the right of the "staying" spouse, the phrase may also imply
that the "moving" parent has breached an implied obligation of
the joint custody agreement to remain in Louisiana. This may give
the "staying" spouse a legal advantage in seeking sole custody by
providing a strong factor to be weighed by the court in reaching its
decision.
Another problem with the statute is its lack of standards or
criteria for evaluating the "staying" parent's petition for sole custody.
"Material change in circumstances" has been the normal jurispruden-
tial justification for modifying custody," but the statute seems to sug-
gest that one parent's change of domicile to another state may be,
in itself, sufficient evidence of changed circumstances. But if one
parent's move becomes the "per se" criterion for changing joint
custody to sole custody, the best interest of the child may be
thwarted.'
128. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 146 & 157.
129. See text at notes 154-56, infra, for a discussion of express consent.
130. One case suggested several factors for consideration by the court, such as
the comparative age and sex of the child and each parent, physical and emotional
characteristics of the child and each parent, comparison of present and proposed en-
vironment, and length of time the child had been in his present environment. Languirand
v. Languirand, 350 So. 2d 973 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied 352 So. 2d 236 (La. 1977).
More often, however, the courts have merely stated the geieral requirement of material
change in circumstances. King v. King, 245 So. 2d 560 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
131. Some consideration should also be given in such cases to the "best interest
of the parents." It may be that the joint custody terms regarding legal and physical
custody can be interpreted to accommodate the needs of the "moving" parent without
infringing on the custodial rights of the "staying" parent.
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In addition, the statute is unclear regarding the proper outcome
of the "staying" parent's petition for sole custody. Its language sug-
gests that the "staying" parent should be the one to whom sole custody
is automatically granted."' However, this has punitive overtones which
are out of place in a decision-making process which is ostensibly con-
cerned only with the child's welfare. On the other hand, lacking a
clear statutory indication concerning the preferred outcome of the
"staying" parent's petition, a judge may, in the exercise of his discre-
tion, award sole custody to the "moving" parent. Assuming this result
is possible, there seems little justification for interpreting the language
as limiting the right to petition to only the "staying" parent.
Natural Co-Tutorship
Natural co-tutorship is another major problem area in the new joint
custody provisions. The provisional custody article states that "the hus-.
band and wife shall enjoy the natural co-tutorship of such children,"'33
while the permanent custody article states that "they... shall be entitled
to become the natural co-tutors of such child or children."" The difference
in language most likely reflects the fact that until the marriage is ter-
minated by separation or divorce, the parental authority, which is in many
ways similar to natural tutorship, exists of right."5 Until the separation
or divorce, therefore, the parents can act on behalf of their children
because they are parents and need not qualify as tutors." However, once
the marriage is terminated, although entitled to become natural co-tutors,
they cannot act on behalf of the minor as tutors until qualified as such.'37
Presumably, joint custodians will have to follow the same qualifica-
tion procedures for natural co-tutorship that always have been required
for individual natural tutors.'38 In some cases, this may result in over-
protection of the minor. Should both parents have substantial im-
132. This would seem to be implied by the language granting only the "staying"
parent the right to so petition. See discussion in text following note 127, supra.
133. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146.
134. LA. CIV. CODE art. 157 (emphasis added).
135. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 216 & 221; LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 4501-02. During the mar-
riage, this authority is primarily vested in the father, but the mother can exercise
the right when the father is unable, refuses, or neglects to do so. Murphy v. McHughes,
66 So. 2d 525 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953).
136. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 216 & 221; art. 4501. LA. CODE Civ. P. See also Higgin-
botham v. Inland Empire Ins. Co., 88 So. 2d 711 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956).
137. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4501; Griffith v. Roy, 263 La. 712, 269 So. 2d 217 (1972).
138. See Mitchell v. Cooley, 12 Rob. 636 (1846); Griffith y. Roy, 263 La. 712, 269
So. 2d 217 (1972); LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4061 (natural tutor must take oath, inventory
property, furnish security or legal mortgage in favor of minor).
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movable property to which the legal mortgage will attach"3 9 or if both
parents choose to furnish alternative forms of security,"' the value
of the minor's property will be protected by double security. Logical-
ly, the essential protective function of the security requirements would
be met if the value of the minor's property is adequately covered
by the total security furnished by the co-tutors. However, although
the court has the authority to require the natural tutor to furnish
more than the legal mortgage,"" it does not have statutory authority
to reduce or eliminate the security requirements for one of two
co-tutors.
This situation could be further complicated if one of the parents
is assigned sole responsibility for administration of the minor's
property.' This parent should then be the only one required to give
any kind of security for losses due to mismanagement of the
property.' On the other hand, since both are still liable in solido for
other liabilities of the child,"' the appointment of one as property ad-
ministrator may be irrelevant to the security question.
One potential problem which the statute does solve concerns the
proper venue for filing the qualification petition. The parents are to
file a joint petition for appointment as co-tutors "in the district court
of the parish in which the proceedings for divorce or judicial separa-
tion were instituted."'' Thus the same court will hear and decide the
separation or divorce, the custody question, and the co-tutorship ap-
plication. Therefore, any modifications of the co-tutorship authority
will be approved or disapproved by a court which is familiar with
the details of the joint custody agreement.
Other co-tutorship problems have not been addressed by the new
provisions. The tutor is the proper party to bring"" or defend"' an
action on behalf of the minor. This simple procedural rule becomes
complicated when there are two tutors with equal authority, privileges,
and responsibilities. Can one of the parents act alone to bring or de-
fend an action? Must the other co-tutor be joined as a necessary, or
139. See LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 4061 & 4134.
140. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art§. 4061 & 4135.
141. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4135.
142. See text at notes 163-64, infra.
143. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 4069 & 4262 et seq.
144. See text at notes 165-67, infra.
145. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4031.
146. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 683.
147. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 732.
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even indispensable, party? And as sole administrator of the minor's
property, may that parent act alone on a property-related claim? These
questions may have to be addressed by legislation."8
Fortunately, most of these co-tutorship problems will remain
hypothetical, because, typically, there is no need for tutorship. Most
minors do not have significant property which requires protection and
management, nor do most children get involved in tort actions as
plaintiffs."9 Therefore, most joint custodial parents will never need
to apply or qualify for natural co-tutorship.
The Joint Custody Agreement
The fourth major area in which problems may arise concerns the
joint custody agreement itself. The statutes merely require that "both
husband and wife agree to joint custody"; '1 it shall be granted "to
both jointly by agreement of both husband and wife.""'' The method
of indicating agreement is not set out; therefore, it presumably could
148. Perhaps this legislation could track the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure
article 686.
Either spouse is the proper plaintiff, during the existence of the marital com-
munity, to sue to enforce a community right; however, if one spouse is the manag-
ing spouse with respect to the community right sought to be enforced, then that
spouse is the proper plaintiff to bring an action to enforce the right. . . . When
only one spouse sues to enforce a community right, the other spouse is a necessary
party ...
Analogous treatment would make the co-tutors necessary parties to any action for
or against the minor, but would allow the property administrator acting alone to bring
or defend actions related to the minor's property. However, unlike the matrimonial
regime in which each spouse's own interests could be affected by such an action, only
the child's interests would be determined in an action brought by one or both co-
tutors. Therefore either one of them should be able to act alone to enforce the minor's
rights, without joinder of the other co-tutor whose interests would be unaffected.
Code of Civil Procedure article 3992(2) also suggests an analogy. It provides that
"If a tutor of his [the minor's] property and a tutor of his person have been appointed,
the consent of both is necessary [for emancipation of the minor]." Written consent
from the parent not involved in property administration could be deemed sufficient
authorization for the other to act alone on a property-related claim.
Further support for this can be found in Official Revision Comment (c) to Code of
Civil Procedure article 4069, which states, "All articles in this Title [Title 6, Tutor-
ship] dealing with the care of the minor's person apply to the custodian of the person;
whereas those dealing with the administration of property apply to the tutor of the
property." This suggests that, once the legal responsibility has been divided with court
approval, no consent or joinder of the "physical custodian" is required when property
administration is necessary.
149. The minor as defendant can be represented by an appointed attorney. LA.
CODE Civ. P. art. 5091(1) & (2).
150. LA. CIV. CODE art. 146.
151. LA. CIV. CODE art. 157.
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be written or verbal, express or tacit. 52 Of course, an express, writ-
ten agreement is always preferable in order to avoid future conflicts
concerning the exact terms of the agreement.
Drafting a precise, yet flexible, agreement is never easy and the
task is made more difficult when the statute is unclear concerning
which terms may be permissible objects of stipulations between the
parties. The general rule is that anything not specifically denied by
statute nor contrary to public order may be stipulated by the parties
to a contract." Unfortunately, the statute does not, in express terms,
specifically deny anything; yet it impliedly rejects certain stipulations.
For example, it is not clear whether the "staying" spouse can waive
the right to petition for sole custody in the event the other parent
moves out of state." Clearly, the legislature intended to discourage
the joint custodial parents from such moves. But since the "staying"
spouse's option of filing or not filing such a petition is permissive ac-
cording to the statute, the parties may wish to incorporate an ex-
press waiver of this option-an express consent,5 in advance, to either
spouse's moving out of state while maintaining joint custody.
The statute is more precise in its treatment of shared physical
custody of the child. Since such sharing is clearly permissive," the
parents should be able to structure the agreement to best suit their
needs and those of the children. They may seek an equal division of
time by days, weeks, or months; or they may divide physical custody
unequally, by the week and weekends or school-months and vacation-
months. The wording of the statute thus does not require that the
child be "shuttled back and forth" between two homes, and the disad-
vantage of the "yo-yo" effect can be avoided.'57 On the other hand,
if physical sharing is not made a part of the arrangement, the strongest
152. It is unclear whether this agreement must be prearranged and submitted
by the parties at the custody hearing, or whether a simple verbal affirmation of the
parties in court will suffice for a joint custody award. Several states' statutes allow
either method to indicate agreement. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE S 4600.5(a) (West Supp.
1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 46b-56, sec. 2(b) (1981). See text at notes 128-29, supra,
for discussion of a tacit agreement.
153. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 11, 1764 & 1967.
154. Not every legislative statement amounts to a "rule of public order"; these
usually reflect strong societal and moral standards. Given the imprecision and am-
biguity in this optional provision allowing the "staying" spouse to petition for sole
custody, it would be exaggerating the import of the phrase to accord it such status.
See discussion at notes 126-29, supra.
155. See text at 128-29, supra, for a discussion of tacit consent.
156. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 146 & 157.
157. See text at notes 53-58, supra.
19821
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
advantages to children and parents are also eliminated."' As a result
of this permissive wording and Louisiana's historic antipathy to divided
custody,59 it may be possible to fashion ostensibly "joint" arrangements
which, as a practical matter, will be nothing more than sole custody
with a new label. The only difference will be the continued sharing,
to some extent, of legal parental rights and responsibilities.
The leeway to be given parents in dividing legal custody is less
clear. The only reference to legal relationships is in the statutory man-
date that both parents "shall" have natural co-tutorship of the
children."6° Article 250 describes this as a relationship of equals, but
then reneges with the words, "unless modified by agreement of the
parents and approved by the court awarding joint custody."'' Evidently,
the parents are free to modify the co-tutorship to provide unequal
legal rights and responsibilities, but this is subject to review by the
judge. Amended article 4262 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
a clue as to one permissible type of inequality which could be
stipulated.' It suggests that the agreement may give the right to
administer the minor's property to one parent individually; that parent
will also bear attendant responsibilities individually." Other divisions
of legal rights and responsibilities are not prohibited, so these should
also be available to the parents. Examples of such divisions are an
allocation to one parent of responsibility for major decisions affecting
the child's health, education, and religion, and an allocation of con-
158. See text at notes 67-72, supra.
159. See LeBouef v. LeBouef, 325 So. 2d 290 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Wilmot v.
Wilmot, 223 La. 221, 65 So. 2d 321 (1953).
160. LA. CIV. CODE art. 250:
Upon the death of either parent, the tutorship of minor children belongs of right
to the other. Upon divorce or judicial separation from bed and board of parents,
the tutorship of each minor child belongs of right to the parent under whose
care he or she has been placed or to whose care he or she has been entrusted;
however, if the parents are awarded joint custody of a minor child, then the cotutor-
ship of the minor child shall belong to both parents, with equal authority, privileges,
and responsibilities, unless modified by agreement of the parents and approved
by the court awarding joint custody.
All those cases are called tutorship by nature.
See text at notes 133-37, supra.
161. LA. CIV. CODE art. 250.
162. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4262: "Natural cotutors shall be bound in solido except as
to damages arising from the administration of all or a part of the minor's property
by one of the cotutors individually pursuant to an agreement between the cotutors
approved by the court."
163. Id. However, since this provision is a part of the tutorship article, it may
refer to a separate, distinct co-tutorship agreement and not be intended to apply to
the simple custody agreement in any way.
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tribution rights'" between the parents. The procedural article does
direct that "natural cotutors shall be bound in solido except as to
damages arising from the administration of all or a part of the minor's
property by one of the cotutors individually.""' By excepting only the
agreed-upon, court-approved property administration, the article sug-
gests that each parent will be bound for the whole of any other claim
against the minor. This would seem to include tort damages and claims
against the minor's property when no agreement has been approved
as to its individual administration. Unless some derogation of the
public order can be demonstrated, the parents should be able to specify
contribution rights between the two of them."
The co-tutorship articles indicate that court approval will be re-
quired for any modification of the parents' equal co-tutorship rights
and responsibilities'67 and for designation of one parent as ad-
ministrator of the minor's property.' 8 However, there is no such ap-
proval required for any other term of the joint custody agreement,"9
which, in the majority of cases, will probably not even attempt to
establish or modify tutorship. Nor are there any standards established
upon which the court can base its approval. Will the court inquire
into the "fitness" of the property administrator? Is the judge required
to consider the best interest of the child? Can he look also to the
164. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2317: "We are responsible, not only for the damage occasion-
ed by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom we
are answerable .. .with the following modifications."
LA. CiV. CODE art. 2318: "The father, or (and) after his decease, the mother, are respon-
sible for the damage occasioned by their minor or unemancipated children, residing
with them, or placed by them under the care of other persons, reserving to them
recourse against those persons.
The same responsibility attaches to the tutors of minors."
In the joint custody situation, the child will always be "residing with" one parent,
who thus is liable for his damages according to article 2318. But the other parent
will also be liable at the same time for the same damages because, although he has
"placed the minor into the care of another," he is still primarily liable with rights
of recourse. By definitioni in Civil Code article 2091 and by implication in Code of
Civil Procedure article 4262, this "concurrent" liability for the whole damage caused
by the minor is in solido liability. Contribution between co-debtors in solido is allowed
by Civil Code articles 2103 and 2104 and by the reservation of recourse in article
2318. The enforcement of the contribution right could be waived by one of the parents,
according to Civil Code article 11. This would effectively shift the burden of tort liability
between the parties to one or the other of the parents, by shifting the contribution right.
165. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4262.
166. LA. CIv. CODE art. 11. See note 164, supra.
167. LA. CIv. CODE art. 250. See note 164, supra.
168. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4262.
169. No court approval is required for the logistical arrangements for physical shar-
ing of the child, for instance.
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best interests of the parents? These questions are unanswered by the
statute and will be left once again to the discretion of the courts.
Different Standards will have to be developed for evaluating a
simple joint custody agreement which makes no mention of the in-
tent of the parents to petition for co-tutorship and the more complex
agreement which contemplates actual co-tutorship and possibly
modification of legal duties and rights. The simple petition can prob-
ably be evaluated with a general "best interest of the child" stan-
dard, perhaps utilizing a list of factors similar to those used in several
other states." ° If a workable physical arrangement appears to have
been devised by the parties, shared physical custody on a regular,
alternating basis should be encouraged. If no co-tutorship is con-
templated, the parents should also be able to shift legal responsibilities
between themselves as they wish, 7' unless there are indications of
overreaching or potential financial hardship to one party. At some
point; the best interests of the parents need to be considered also,
if only because the child's well-being is always affected by the emo-
tional and physical stability of the parents.'72
When actual co-tutorship is contemplated and described in the
agreement, the more stringent standards of ordinary tutorship pro-
ceedings must be applied."' These guidelines are quite detailed and
specific; they should adequately protect the minor's interests when
joint custody includes co-tutorship.
The court unfortunately may have little effective enforcement
power over the agreement. Generally, courts will not grant specific
performance of an obligation to do.'74 Therefore, should one of the
parents fail to uphold the agreement, the only apparent recourse for
the other parent would be to petition for sole custody. This would
be rather drastic if that party truly desired joint custody and sought
only a way to make it workable. Alternatively, one parent could at-
tempt to enforce the joint custody agreement by seeking damages for
breach of contract from the other.'75 This remedy shares the weakness
of the petition for sole custody in that it is not actually a method
170. See text at notes 109 & 122, supra.
171. See text at notes 160-66, supra.
172. See text at notes 77-83, supra.
173. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 4031-4463. See text at notes 138-44, supra.
174. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1905, 1926 & 1927; Goudeau v. Daigle, 124 F.2d 656 (5th
Cir. 1942), cert. denied 316 U.S. 695 (1942); Pratt v. McCoy, 128 La. 617, 54 So. 1012
(1911); Branch v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 169 So. 129 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1936).
175. A weakness of this remedy is that the measure and entitlement to such damages




which will effectuate the joint custody agreement; it is, rather, a
recognition of the breakdown of the contract. Courts have used the
contempt power to enforce visitation provisions in sole custody
situations;17 perhaps this will also be a viable enforcement tool when
applied to joint custody. On the other hand, since a joint custody ar-
rangement requires a high degree of cooperation between the parents,
if use of the contempt power is necessary it could be regarded as
conclusive evidence of failure of the arrangement.
Suggested Applications of Joint Custody in Louisiana
The "no-fault" divorce'77 theoretically would seem to present the
most ideal situation for a joint custody agreement. Because an ac-
cusatory, adversarial proceeding is unnecessary, the parents should
be able to avoid recriminations and cooperate in the custody ar-
rangements. Even when the divorce or separation involves allegations
of fault on one side or both, 78 an attempt should be made by the par-
ties' attorneys to at least acquaint them with the possibility of a joint
custody award. If both parents sincerely want custody, they may be
persuaded to put aside hostilities in order to achieve benefits for both
themselves and their children.
In all joint custody awards, it will be advisable to prepare an ex-
press, detailed, written agreement. 79 The three essential requirements
for joint custody in Louisiana should at least be alleged,"s and
preferably supported with some evidence as to the Louisiana domicile
of both parents and as--to how joint custody serves the best interest
of the child. It should contain definite time limits and methods for
achieving shared physical custody;... the agreement should also
delineate carefully the allocation of rights, responsibilities, and authority
of legal custody. Flexibility should be built into the agreement so
the parents can adjust the terms to fit reality. If co-tutorship appears
necessary, any modification of its equal authority provisions must be
176. See Fouchi v. Fouchi, 391 So. 2d 1352 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980); Lemoine v.
Lemoine, 303 So. 2d 520 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974). One case specifically stated that
courts generally try to avoid restrictions and court supervision of custody orders unless
unusual circumstances exist. LeBouef v. Fontenot 390 So. 2d 266 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
177. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 138(9) & (10); LA. CIv. CODE art. 139; LA. R.S. 9:302 (1950
& Supp. 1977).
178. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 138(1-8), 139(1)(2) & 141.
179. See text at notes 150-66, supra.
180. See text at notes 98-100, supra.
181. See text at notes 156-59, supra. One commentator has suggested that the prac-
ticality and workability of any allocation of physical custody should be measured by
a "reasonableness" test. This would allow a variety of physical arrangements to fit
the requirements of all family members. Note, supra note 5, at 124-25.
182. See text at notes 160-66, supra.
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included for court approval.18 An important stipulation which should
not be ignored is some method for submitting major disagreements
to arbitration in order, to avoid the necessity of returning to court
for resolution of disputes.1" Since the statutory provisions contain so
few guidelines for judicial decision, a carefully drawn joint custody
agreement will be an invaluable aid to the Louisiana judge who seeks
to make a joint custody award. It will indicate to him that both parents
have a sincere interest in the child, that both can cooperate at least
to the extent required to draw up the agreement, and that both are
willing to submit future disagreements to a forum other than the court-
room. Obviously, joint custody is not a panacea. Its implementation
will be difficult under the best of circumstances. However, for those
parents for whom the potential advantages outweigh the disadvan-
tages, Louisiana now does offer joint custody as an alternative.
Unanswered questions and details have been left to the parents, the
lawyers, and the judges; all should strive to minimize joint custody's
pitfalls and maximize its advantages.185
Lois E. Hawkins
183. See text at notes 133-49 & 167-68, supra.
184. However, arbitration contracts have the same weakness as the overall custody
agreement, in that usually they are not specifically enforced. See Saint v. Martel, 127
La. 73, 53 So. 432 (1910).
185. Subsequent to the writing of this comment, the Louisiana Legislature passed Act
307 of 1982, which substantially modifies Louisiana's child custody provisions. The new
law attempts to eliminate many of the vagueries and inconsistencies discussed in this
article. Its provisions are progressive and innovative and thrust Louisiana into the
vanguard among the states which have joint custody statutes. The full text of the
law's major joint custody provisions is produced below:
Article 146.
Custody of children pending the litigation.
A. If there are children of the marriage whose provisional keeping is claimed
by both husband and wife, the suit being yet pending and undecided, custody
shall be awarded in thefollowing order of preference, according to the best
interests of the children:
1. To both parents jointly. The court, shall, unless waived by the court
for good cause shown, require the parents to submit a plan for im-
plementation of the custody order or the parents acting individual-
ly or in concert may submit a custody implementation plan to the
court prior to issuance of a custody decree ....
2. To either parent. In making an order for custody to either parent,
the court shall consider, among other factors, which parent is more
likely to allow the child or children frequent and continuing contact
with the noncustodial parent, and shall not prefer a parent as custo-
dian because of that parent's sex. The burden of proof that joint custody
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would not be in a child's best interest shall be upon the parent requesting
sole custody.
C. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in the best in-
terest of a minor child unless:
1. The parents have agreed to an award of custody to one parent or
so agree in open court at a hearing for the purpose of determining
the custody of a minor child of the marriage; or
2. The court finds that joint custody would not be in the best interest
of the child.
For the purpose of assisting the court in making a determination
whether an award of joint custody is appropriate, the court may
direct that an investigation be conducted.
D. For purposes of this Article 'joint custody' shall mean the parents shall
share the physical custody of children of the marriage, subject to any plan
of implementation effected pursuant to paragraph A of this Article, and
shall enjoy the natural cotutorship of such children in accordance with Arti-
cle 250. Physical care and custody shall be shared by the parents in such
a way as to assure a child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents.
An award of joint custody obligates the parties to exchange information
concerning the health, education, and welfare of the minor child; and, unless
allocated, apportioned, or decreed, the parents or parties shall confer with
one another in the exercise of decision-making rights, responsibilities, and
authority.
E. Any order for joint custody, or any plan of implementation effected pur-
suant to Paragraph A of this Article, may be modified or terminated upon
the petition of one or both parents or on the court's own motion, if it is shown
that the best interest of the child requires modification or termination of
the order. The court shall state in its decision the reasons for modification
or termination of the joint custody order if either parent opposes the
modification or termination order.
F. Any order for the custody of a minor child of a marriage entered by a court
in this state or in any other state, subject to jurisdictional requirements,
may be modified at any time to an order of joint custody in accordance with
the provisions of this Article.
G. A custody hearing may be held in private chambers of the judge.
H. In jurisdictions having a private or publicly- supported conciliation service,
the court or the parties may, at any time, pursuant to local rules of court,
consult with the conciliation service for the purpose of assisting the par-
ties to formulate a plan for implementation of the custody order or to resolve
any controversy which has arisen in the implementation of a plan for
custody.
I. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, access to records and infor-
mation pertaining to a minor child, including but not limited to medical,
dental, and school records, shall not be denied to a parent because the parent
is not the child's custodial parent.
Article 157:
A. In all cases of separation and divorce, and change of custody after an original
award, permanent custody of the child or children shall be granted to...
the parents in accordance with Article 146.
(Emphasis added).

